Tuesday, May 9, 2017

Peter Klevius sex and consciousness tutorial for UC Berkeley's "star philosophy professor" John Searle


Peter Klevius, Stephen Hawking - and John Searle, on sex, free will and consciousness.


Because Klevius has always been physically extremely fit all his life, and because he has never needed any other stimuli than heterosexual attraction to perform sex whenever it suits him and (women) and in full control, Klevius fully understands and has sympathy for a guy like Stephen Hawking.



Diagnosed at 21 with the debilitating disease ALS has left him almost entirely paralyzed, to speak, he has an infrared sensor mounted on his eyeglasses that picks up twitches from a muscle in his cheek and transmits them to a screen with scrolling letters, stopping at each desired letter. He averages about a word a minute. However, his testosterone levels are still sky high compared to any woman on the planet, and his penis shouldn't have been altered by ALS.

Therefore it comes as no aurprise that Hawking is said to be a big fan of strip clubs.

Peter Stringfellow, who runs Stringfellows strip clubs: “Isn’t he the answer to people who attack the sexual side of our human-ness? They’re all charging at windmills, you know. It’s there.”


Peter Klevius: However, the windmill is male!

Hawking became a regular at Stringfellows strip club in London, and Stringfellow recalls one night: 'I went and introduced myself and said, ‘Mr. Hawking, it’s an honor to meet you. If you could spare a minute or two, I’d love to chat with you about the universe. Or would you rather look at the girls? The Girls, Hawking answered.’

Hawking has also reportedly been spotted numerous times getting lap dances at the California strip club Devore, and was even said to have frequented Freedom Acres, a swinger’s club in California.

“I have seen Stephen Hawking at the club more than a handful of times,” a member said, according to the Huffington Post. 'He arrives with an entourage of nurses and assistants. Last time I saw him, he was in the back ‘play area’ lying on a bed fully clothed with two naked women gyrating all over him.'

Tim Holt, University of Cambridge press officer, later confirmed that Hawking had frequented the swinger’s club, but claimed that he wasn’t a regular. 'This report is greatly exaggerated. He visited once a few years ago with friends while on a visit to California.'

Klevius: "Gyrating all over him". Klevius is sure he had a nice time although Klevius also recalls a so called "top massage" performed by a lady who rather seemed aimed for ejaculation than heterosexual eroticism. So Klevius can see a certain handicap in these kind of situations for people like Hawking - unless, of course, he was able to communicate his feelings via some gadget, and moreover, that the ladies respected it. Ejaculation is short like a sneeze, while active hetero-eroticism can last for long.

However, and this is Klevius sex segregation point: Never let heterosexual attraction shade personhood. Here both men and women often miss the point. Men see women as the "heterosexual other", sometimes even "inferior other", and women often contribute to this view by confusing their heterosexual attraction with their personhood. The "body" sociology didn't help either to get out of this unfortunate catch 22 that Klevius has pointed at since his teens*.

* As a teenager Klevius was forced out of his country alone, without money, and with no previous ties. However, although Klevius managed the language and fixed a decent job, he didn't manage the local, and quite different dialect, which caused problems communicating with prejudicial teen girls at noisy discotheques etc. However, in his job environment he happened to meet a very nice girl whose pictures he had used to drool over in a "men's magazine", and who told him she had never had sex. Klevius also met many young university teens who offered "posing" (sometimes Klevius got it even for free) in the main news paper and who had their "offices" just behind Klevius workplace in the most central part of the capital city. Those girls made a very distinct line (no copulation) between themselves and what they called the "whores". Times have changed but the entanglement of heterosexual attraction and female personhood in sex segregation is still equally unsolved for most girls/women. But with a (negative) Human Rights approach based on the 1948 Universal Human Rights Declaration no woman should have to suffer of sex segregational prejudices about sex - no matter how sexy men might think she looks like, and no matter if she doesn't want to have to do with heterosex or sex at all, icl. if she doesn't want to have children.

Yes, Klevius knows. These kind of thoughts make him an evil "islamophobe". But that's sadly the fate nowadays for anyone defending everyone's Human Rights - even women's.

Drawing from 1979 by Peter Klevius.

John Searle seems to have a quite different approach to heterosexual attraction and consciousness than Klevius.


In a lawsuit Joanna Ong, 24, is seeking damages for sexual harassment and assault as well as for wrongful termination and creation of a hostile work environment.
“As a philosopher, Searle should be familiar with the concept of coercion. Instead, he and the university have “used their power and platform to abuse others.”

The lawsuit, which lists Searle and the Regents of the University of California as defendants, claims Searle groped Ong in his office after he told her “they were going to be lovers.” He also said he had an “emotional commitment to making her a public intellectual,” the complaint states, and that he was “going to love her for a long time.” Ong turned Searle down and reported him to other UC Berkeley employees, but they did nothing, the complaint states. Instead, Searle cut Ong’s salary and she was eventually fired, according to the complaint, which also claims Searle watched pornography at work and made sexist comments.

Searle, 84, is famous for his work in the philosophy of language and the philosophy of mind and has taught at UC Berkeley since 1959.


Artificial intelligence (AI), consciousness - and EMAH


Wikipedia: Artificial intelligence (AI) is intelligence exhibited by machines. In computer science, the field of AI research defines itself as the study of "intelligent agents": any device that perceives its environment and takes actions that maximize its chance of success at some goal

Peter Klevius: A shock absorber fulfills every bit of this definition - and can be digitally translated, i.e. e.g. "shock absorbed by wire", either partially or fully!

Wikipedia: As machines become increasingly capable, mental facilities once thought to require intelligence are removed from the definition. For instance, optical character recognition is no longer perceived as an example of "artificial intelligence", having become a routine technology.

Are there limits to how intelligent machines – or human-machine hybrids – can be? A superintelligence, hyperintelligence, or superhuman intelligence is a hypothetical agent that would possess intelligence far surpassing that of the brightest and most gifted human mind. ‘’Superintelligence’’ may also refer to the form or degree of intelligence possessed by such an agent.

The philosophical position that John Searle has named "strong AI" states: "The appropriately programmed computer with the right inputs and outputs would thereby have a mind in exactly the same sense human beings have minds." Searle counters this assertion with his Chinese room argument, which asks us to look inside the computer and try to find where the "mind" might be.

Searle's thought experiment begins with this hypothetical premise: suppose that artificial intelligence research has succeeded in constructing a computer that behaves as if it understands Chinese. It takes Chinese characters as input and, by following the instructions of a computer program, produces other Chinese characters, which it presents as output.

Suppose, says Searle, that this computer performs its task so convincingly that it comfortably passes the Turing test: it convinces a human Chinese speaker that the program is itself a live Chinese speaker. To all of the questions that the person asks, it makes appropriate responses, such that any Chinese speaker would be convinced that they are talking to another Chinese-speaking human being.

Searle then supposes that he is in a closed room and has a book with an English version of the computer program, along with sufficient paper, pencils, erasers, and filing cabinets. Searle could receive Chinese characters through a slot in the door, process them according to the program's instructions, and produce Chinese characters as output. If the computer had passed the Turing test this way, it follows, says Searle, that he would do so as well, simply by running the program manually.

Searle asserts that there is no essential difference between the roles of the computer and himself in the experiment. Each simply follows a program, step-by-step, producing a behavior which is then interpreted as demonstrating intelligent conversation. However, Searle would not be able to understand the conversation. ("I don't speak a word of Chinese",he points out.) Therefore, he argues, it follows that the computer would not be able to understand the conversation either.

Searle argues that, without "understanding" (or "intentionality"), we cannot describe what the machine is doing as "thinking" and, since it does not think, it does not have a "mind" in anything like the normal sense of the word. Therefore, he concludes that "strong AI" is false.

Peter Klevius: Nonsense! 'Intentionality' is an illusion. There's no "gap" between input and output where 'intentionality' could be squeezed in. Moreover, if Searle believes in 'intentionality' he can't refute 'the free will' either. The machine could also be understood by the Chinese speakers without "understanding" - only fulfilling the Turing criterion. There is no 'understanding' or consciousness', other than the usage of these terms.

Wikipedia: No one would think of saying, for example, "Having a hand is just being disposed to certain sorts of behavior such as grasping" (manual behaviorism), or "Hands can be defined entirely in terms of their causes and effects" (manual functionalism), or "For a system to have a hand is just for it to be in a certain computer state with the right sorts of inputs and outputs" (manual Turing machine functionalism), or "Saying that a system has hands is just adopting a certain stance toward it" (the manual stance). (p. 263)

Searle argues that philosophy has been trapped by a false dichotomy: that, on the one hand, the world consists of nothing but objective particles in fields of force, but that yet, on the other hand, consciousness is clearly a subjective first-person experience.

Searle says simply that both are true: consciousness is a real subjective experience, caused by the physical processes of the brain. (A view which he suggests might be called biological naturalism.)

Ontological subjectivity

Searle has argued[48] that critics like Daniel Dennett, who (he claims) insist that discussing subjectivity is unscientific because science presupposes objectivity, are making a category error. Perhaps the goal of science is to establish and validate statements which are epistemically objective, (i.e., whose truth can be discovered and evaluated by any interested party), but are not necessarily ontologically objective.

Searle calls any value judgment epistemically subjective. Thus, "McKinley is prettier than Everest" is "epistemically subjective", whereas "McKinley is higher than Everest" is "epistemically objective." In other words, the latter statement is evaluable (in fact, falsifiable) by an understood ('background') criterion for mountain height, like 'the summit is so many meters above sea level'. No such criteria exist for prettiness.

Beyond this distinction, Searle thinks there are certain phenomena (including all conscious experiences) that are ontologically subjective, i.e. can only exist as subjective experience. For example, although it might be subjective or objective in the epistemic sense, a doctor's note that a patient suffers from back pain is an ontologically objective claim: it counts as a medical diagnosis only because the existence of back pain is "an objective fact of medical science".[49] But the pain itself is ontologically subjective: it is only experienced by the person having it.

Searle goes on to affirm that "where consciousness is concerned, the existence of the appearance is the reality".[50] His view that the epistemic and ontological senses of objective/subjective are cleanly separable is crucial to his self-proclaimed biological naturalism.

Klevius: All of this is more or less non sense due to a balancing act (deliberate or just out of ignorance) to satisfy certain needs and wishes. To understand this you need to read Klevius and contrast it with the above:

1 Existence-centrism (Klevius 1992:21-23, ISBN 9173288411), i.e. the simple fact that there's no difference between 'reality' and 'conscious experiences'.

2 Klevius EMAH - the Even More Astonishing Hypothesis which eliminates prejudices about the mind, as well as the naive idea about "a thoughtful and subjective brain", and therefore opens up for a human brain that fits the nature it belongs to and from which it emerged. Moreover, Klevius analysis also opens up for a more truly human approach to other humans, i.e. that that's what we have in common - and only we can see it, not a non-human (Klevius 1992:36-39), which fact doesn't eliminate that we should try to cope with non-humans in a "humane" way.









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Thursday, May 4, 2017

Why didn't Klevius get the Nobel prize for his groundbreaking* brain research (EMAH)? And praise** from animal activists!


* You can't find anything earlier than Klevius on this topic - no matter were you search! It's original research and it fulfills the criterion of fitting in the gaps that existing research has failed to explain. When in 1994 Klevius tried to publish the text in scientific AI magazines, one rejected it as 'too philosophical' for their type of magazine and the other as 'too empirical'! Moreover, wherever Klevius has presented the theory he has always asked receivers to comment, question or challenge it. No one, except for one of Klevius sons (who argues that a fruit fly has "consciousness" as well), has done it so far.

** Just consider how many animals could have been saved from suffering and death by directing research in accordance with Klevius theory, hence avoiding a lot of unnecessary dead ends. 

So why is Klevius bragging - or is he? 


Answer: In the service of better science. Why/how? Dichotomies created out of pre-established goals have cumulated in science in an accelerating tempo in line with Klevius chapter Science and its References (1992:40). Financing, politics and religion are some of the main culprits for this streamlining. And on the other hand, the best (least biased) science now resides outside "established" (compare media) science channels - but with limited access to basic resources which are withheld, usually behind a pay wall, by keeping new findings in secret etc..  Even though there are a few "established" proponents for a more open research realm (e.g. John Hawks), real openings for the future now lie in the independent blogosphere (compare e.g. Eurogenes). However, even such a forum is equally contaminated with less capable minds as is "established" science. When Klevius permanented his thoughts with publishing dates, ISBN numbers, correspondence etc.  he had a much lower expectation about his own capabilities compared to "established" science, but thought he might have had something new or of some importance to say. However, in retrospective Klevius has become increasingly disappointed with what "established" science has produced in some particular areas of his (and hopefully humankind's) interest. So Klevius isn't bragging - just disappointed with the frequent use of "science blockers".

Peter Klevius first in the world to explain why/how the Thalamus is at the center of your "consciousness", and more importantly, what "consciousness" really is


The text below is mostly very old and poorly edited - have mercy or donate! And do remember that Klevius will answer/explain any question you may pose via comments!

Klevius preface: Fake "research" vs. true science.


* Do note the difference between 'research' and 'science', e.g. by using Klevius definition and analysis of science. Normal research is the screwing and hammering pieces together. However, it often turns into more or less fake "research" under a financially or culturally biased professor etc. Science again, is ideally pure logic, but us pure logic per se has no meaningful existence, it has to be connected to human existence-centrism (see same named chapter in Klevius 1992:21), i.e. a human interface. So to do true science means to avoid as much as possible to contaminate it with bias. And of course, the goal isn't and could never be to eliminate (human) bias - only to make its human interface as wide as possible. The con side of this, however, is that good scientists and good science will always clash with someone/something. Compare this problem to much democracy of today that tries to capture a picture of the will of the people by using a 2 pixel democracy camera resulting in a 1 pixel result when the self evident solution would be to use high resolution digitalization via deeply profiled (with a variety of possible  voter interests taken account of) web voting giving a direct connection between the will of the people and factual politics. Such a system could also include triggers for existing laws re. particular issues so to make it easy for the voter to pinpoint his wishes in the general already existing political/legal reality.

Peter Klevius anti bias science cv timeline with examples of how truly scientific analysis* is made:


1 1979-1980 Klevius, in an effort to track the social origins and consequences of early civilizations, first concluded that the traces pointed north and to central-Asia. Klevius then sent a letter to the Finland-Swedish philosopher Georg Henrik von Wright (Wittgenstein's successor at Cambridge) about these thoughts and the new concept of 'extended demand for resources'. The letter can be found in the archive of now late GHvW (Klevius signed it with his mother's surname Kotilainen). The answer was very supportive as GHvW saw the concept and its embeddings as 'both original' and 'of significant importance for our understanding and analyzing of civilizations'.

2 1981 Klevius then published his thoughts for the first time under the title 'Demand for Resources' (still using his mother's surname). The publication was first delayed (possibly due to its heavy intellectuality for such a forum) but was eventually released due to GHvW being a friend of Jan Magnus Jansson* who was the editorial chief of Hufvudstadsbladet, in which the article first appeared - and was rewarded Fmk 500,- which at that time corresponded to a third of an average monthly net salary.

* Jan Magnus Jansson was a Professor of general state science at the University of Helsinki 1954–74 and chancellor for the Åbo Akademi University 1985 to 1991. He was the chairman of the (Finland-)Swedish People's Party (SPP) 1966 to 1973 and a Minister of Trade and Industry 1 January 1973 - 30 September 1974. Jansson was his Finland-Swedish party's presidential candidate in the elections of 1982.
3 1984 Klevius (still as Kotilainen) published his article 'The Green Dilemma' in which he warned for, on one hand the "Pentti Linkola effect"* of what some used to call "eco-fascism", and on the other hand a "green movement" that is "green" only to its name (Klevius exemplified with a family where the well paid husband travels with a big expensive and much fuel consuming car around the country selling cheap car etc. products to service stations, shops etc. while his not working wife drives around in an other car meeting with her "green" friends in activities of minor, or even opposite, greenish value). Moreover, this was Klevius first warning of the politicization of the green movement that today has made it a supporter of state socialism and islamofascism. 

* Pentti Linkola is a radical Finnish deep ecologist, polemicist and fisherman. He has written widely about his ideas and in Finland is a prominent, and highly controversial, thinker. Linkola was a year-round fisherman from 1959 to 1995. Linkola blames humans for the continuous degradation of the environment. He promotes rapid population decline in order to combat the problems commonly attributed to overpopulation. He is also strongly in favour of deindustrialization and opposes democracy, which he calls the "Religion of Death, believing it to be an agent of wasteful capitalism and consumerism. He considers the proponents of economic growth to be ignorant of the destructive effects which free market policies have had on the biosphere over the past two centuries.

1989 Klevius made a program about human evolution in which he also interviewed Richard Leakey. He also met with some guys from South Africa who knew a lot about "Bushmen". As a consequence Klevius studied what was known about them in the literature, e.g. Lee's !Kung reports. The simple question stood clear: Why would Africa's oldest population be cold-adapted, i.e. having clear mongoloid traits even though they were already heavily mixed with non-mongoloid Africans?

1990 Klevius wrote the short but intense (perhaps too intense, according to GHvW) book Demand for Resources (published 1992) - as a follow up to the 1981 article Demand for Resources. It's an analysis of physical and cultural evolution which main methodology is to look behind prevalent contemporary bias (defined as unproved convictions) such as e.g.:


1 Evolution out of nothing/God proposition countered by the question: What would be "nothing"?, hence revealing the total meaninglessness of the question: Why are we here? The equally meaningless counter question would be: Why would we be nowhere?

2 Human evolution to what we are today. The unproved populist theory "out of Africa" seemed spurious in general and did not fit the fact that native Africans such as Khoesan speakers are mongoloids and that big brained early Homos (e.g. Jinniushan) roamed northern China (i.e. cold "mongoloid territory") already almost 300,000 years ago. Also do note that we lack Neanderthal skulls from the very north, and that Europe is a receiver of the Gulf stream. So far we don't even know how "Neanderthal" skulls from more northern parts really looked like. Interestingly, Georg Henrik von Wright considered the last chapter named Khoe, San and Bantu the least important in the book.

3 The linguistic terms Khoe-San and Bantu in Africa exemplify three main categories of way of living: Humter-gatherers (called gatherer-hunters in the book), pastorals, and farmers. These reveal a transition from almost neutral* demand for resources to expanded demand for resources (this should not be confused with the fact that hunter-gatherers need much more space). You want what you need but you necessarily don't need what you want. Expanded demand for resources is the baisis for investment compared to neutral demand for resources in many pre-civilisatoric societies - a fact that Karl Marx missed but Claude Levi-Strauss sort of touched upon with his division of socities in 'warm' and 'cold' using terms from thermodynamics.

4 The observation/understanding dichotomy seems to be a repetition of the ghost/machine dichotomy trapped as it is in its own "Homunculus spirality". So instead Klevius proposed an intellectual "digitalization" of the brain, i.e. a "relief" from the old view of "cathegories". One such "cathegory" is 'language' although there's no definition of it that matches its use as particularly human. Not that 'language' isn't a useful concept in our everyday "language game", but rather that 'language' can not be distinguished from other activities in a meaningful way when it comes to understanding the mind.


2003/4 Klevius for the first time presented the view about a better packed brain as the reason to the sudden jump in human sophistication.

2004 the discovery of Homo floresiensis in SE Asia was presented, and as a consequence Klevius immediately connected it with the obvious possibility of similar evolutionary island dwarfing even north of the Wallace line that later could branche towards the big skulled northerners. The discoveries from 2010 on of a 50,000 bp sewing needle, a more than 40,000 bp sophisticated stone bracelet and the DNA evidence of at least three Homo species mixing/hybridizing in the Altai region/southern Siberia, made Klevius theory even more plausible. At the same time conventional theorists were "confused" and "puxxled" because their theories failed to fit the new landscape.

 The Viking age started in the east ca. 750, i.e. many decades before going west. Also consider that Gotland used to be part of Kvenland/Finnland.

Origin of the Vikings

2005/6 Klevius realized the equally obvious answer to the question why Swedish Vikings would first have gone north and east into Finnish territories instead of south and west where everyone talked the same language. The answer was of course that they weren't Sedes bu Finland-Swedes, i.e. Finns who had become bilingual in the borderline between Indo European and Uralic.

All of these "insights" were simple - as long as you just question prevailing bias - and possess enough intellectual power (knowledge) as well as processing power (intelligence). When people get annoyed about Klevius fast and broad thinking (which he himself can't avoid without acting more stupid than he is) they can be assured that they always have time on their side in case they are right and Klevius wrong.

Klevius analysis of bias in sex segregation/apartheid (with numerous writings, debates, radio/TV programs, film etc. has gone on since his teenage years as part of his view that the ideology of (negative) Human Rights as stated in the 1948 Universal Human Rights Declaration, is the only logical way to go that can't be opposed without being racist/sexist: How can males and females "have the same sexuality" if testosterone is the "sex hormone" and females have 10-15 times less of it? Moreover, if reproduction happens in females, then males have to be attracted to females - not necessarily the other way round.

EMAH, the theory of mind that makes our brain less human and ourselves more human


The text below, based on Peter Klevius book Demand for Resources (1992 in Swedish) and presented for Francis Crick (1994-5), was made globally accessible on line in 2004. In today's communicative environment and with some additional findings Klevius would perhaps have honed it slightly differently although not altering the basis of the theory at all. However, here it is in its original form (main text from 1992 and 1994-5 plus the 2004 web introduction on www.klevius.info*).

* Do note that www.klevius.info is an experimental web museum created 2003 and with no changes for more than a decade. Keep this in mind when reading it.

EMAH text from Klevius web museum:


EMAH (the Even More Astonishing Hypothesis**)
Continuous integration in Thalamus of complex neural patterns without assistance of Homunculus constitutes the basis for memory and "consciousness"            

(*AI = artificial intelligence)
(** The EMAH title applied 1994 alluding to Francis Crick's book
The Astonishing Hypothesis)

by Peter Klevius (1992-94, and 2004)


These links were on the original 2004 web page

Sex segregation from Freud to bin Ladin
Do you believe in Freud? See timeline describing his lifelong and populist "scientific" defense of sex segregation and how he treated/limited his wife!

KLEVIUS' INTERDISCIPLINARY NEWS BLOG: Increase in the dehumanization of women in mainly muslim countries


KLEVIUS' ANTI SEX SEGREGATION BLOG



Basic Concepts in Depth




Sex-segregation




Klevius' Psychosocial Freud Timeline




Psycho State Marries the Social State




Main page with World Values Survey










Klevius' definition of religion  

Inside Klevius' mind




Introduction to EMAH which basis was made public 1992 in Sweden (the home land of the Nobel prize)


Introduction to EMAH, the Even More Astonishing Hypothesis* - AI and the deconstruction of the brain by Peter Klevius

*compare Francis Crick's The Astonishing Hypothesis   

Translation from Resursbegär (Demand for Resources 1992 p 32-33).


A critique of Habermas' dichotomy observing/understanding in The Theory of Communicative Action (1981):

1  Observing a stone = perception understood by the viewer
2  I observe a stone = the word 'stone' (uttered, written etc.) i.e. intelligible for an other person

Although I assume that Habermas would consider the latter example communication because of an allusion (via the language) to the former, I would argue that this "extension" of the meaning of the utterance cannot be demonstrated as being essentially different from the original observation/understanding. Consequently there exists no "abstract" meaning of symbols, which fact of course eliminates the symbol itself. The print color/waves (sound or light etc) of the word "stone" does not differ from the corresponding ones of a real or a fake (e.g. papier maché) stone.

The dichotomy observation/understanding hence cannot be upheld because there does not exist a theoretically defendable difference. What is usually expressed in language games as understanding is a historical - and often hierarchical - aspect of a particular phenomenon/association. Thus it is not surprising that Carl Popper and John C. Eccles tend to use culture-evolutionary interpretations to make pre-civilized human cultures fit in Popper´s World 1 to World 3 system of intellectual transition.


"Subliminal" selection of what we want to interpret as meaningful

The ever-present subsidiary awareness that lies behind the naive concept of "subliminal perceptions" is no more mystifying than the fact that we can walk and play musical instruments without paying direct awareness/attention to it.                                                                         


Representations and properties

Representations are dependent on properties but if there are no properties (and there is certainly a philosophical lack of any such evidence although the concept is still popular in many camps) then there are no representations either. What should be represented (see above and below)?

The lost ghost in the machine and the psychoanalytic chameleon Mr. Nobody

There has been an all time on-going development within biology, genetics, AI research and robot technology, which narrows our view on, not only the difference between animals and humans, but also the gap between what is considered living and dead matter. Not only free will, but also properties and representations/symbols are getting all the more complicated and vanishing as their subjective meaning seems less usable in a new emerging understanding of our environmental positioning. Although the psychoanalytic movement seems ready to confirm/adapt to this development equally fast as Freud himself changed his ideas to fit into new scientific discoveries (it was a pity he didn't get a chance to hear about Francis Crick) psychoanalysis is forever locked out from this reality. PA is doomed to hang on the back of development just as feminism and middle-class politics, without any clue on the direction (neither on the individual nor the collective/cultural level).

Psychoanalysis has survived just because of its weakest (in fact, absent) link, namely the lack of a border between folk psychology and itself. The diagnosis for psychoanalysis would consequently be borderline.

Sigmund's dream of a biological psychoanalysis was his biggest mistake.




The entire EMAH hypothesis (1994) as it emerged after the above criticism of Habermas and some new research about cortex-thalamus connections.




1991 presented for Georg Henrik von Wright, 1994 presented for Francis Crick and 2004 presented on the world wide web*.

* this text used to be on Yahoo's Geocities which is now terminated - by Yahoo



EMAH


Abstract: Thalamus is the least discussed yet perhaps the most important piece in the puzzle of mind, due to its central function as the main relay station between body actions and environment. A critical assessment of concepts such as: observation/understanding, mind/body, free will and language reveals an inescapable awareness in the Thalamic "meetputs". In conclusion memories hence may be better described as linguistic traps rather than as distinct entities. The continuity model proposed in EMAH also avoids the limitations of a "discrete packets of information" model.
Note. In some respect the neural network of "lower" systems such as the spinal cord and cerebellum by far outperforms the cortex. This is because of different tasks (fast motorics and slow adaptations) and due difference in processing. (Copyright Peter Klevius).




Introduction

Understanding how social behavior and its maintenance in human and other forms of life (incl. plants etc) evolved has nothing to do with “the balance between self interest and co-operative behavior” but all to do with kinship and friendship. Although humans may be attributed a more chaotic (i.e. more incalculable) "personality", they are, like life in general, just robots (i.e. active fighters against entropy – see Demand for Resources - on the right to be poor). Misunderstanding (or plain ignorance of – alternatively ideological avoidance of) kinship (kin recognition), friendship (symbiosis), and AI (robotics) pave the way for the formulation of unnecessary, not to say construed, problems which, in an extension, may become problematic themselves precisely because they hinder an open access for direct problem solving (see e.g. Angels of Antichrist – kinship vs. social state).



The Future of a "Gap" (copyright P. Klevius 1992-2004)

Human: What is a human being? Can the answer be found in a non-rational a priori statement (compare e.g. the axiomatic Human Rights individual) or in a logical analysis of the "gap" between human beings and others? The following analysis uses an "anti-gap" approach. It also rests on the struggle and success of research performed in the field of artificial intelligence (AI), robotics etc.

Signal: A "signal gap" is commonly understood as a break in the transition from input to output, i.e., from perception to behavior. Mentalists use to fill the gap with "mind" while behaviorists don't bother because they can't even see it.

Matter: Berkeley never believed in matter. What you experience is what you get and the rest is in the hands of "God" (i.e. uncertainty). This view makes him a super-determinist without "real" matter.

Mind: The confusing mind-body debate originates in the Cartesian dualism, which divides the world into two different substances, which, when put together, are assumed to make the world intelligible. However, on the contrary, they seem to have created a new problem based on this very assumption.

Free will: Following a mind-body world view, many scholars prefer to regard human beings as intentional animals fueled by free will. It is, however, a challenging task to defend such a philosophical standpoint. Not even Martin Luther managed to do it, but rather transferred free will to God despite loud protests from Erasmus and other humanists. Although Luther's thoughts in other respects have had a tremendous influence on Western thinking, this particular angle of view has been less emphasized.

Future: When asked about the "really human" way of thinking, many mentalists refer to our capacity to "calculate" the future. But is there really a future out there? All concepts of the future seem trapped in the past. We cannot actually talk about a certain date in the future as real future. What we do talk about is, for example, just a date in an almanac. Although it is a good guess that we are going to die, the basis for this reasoning always lies in the past. The present hence is the impenetrable mirror between the "real future" and ourselves. Consequently every our effort to approach this future brings us back in history. Closest to future we seem to be when we live intensely in the immediate present without even thinking about future. As a consequence the gap between sophisticated human planning and "instinctual" animal behavior seems less obvious. Is primitive thinking that primitive after all?
An additional aspect of future is that neither youth, deep freezing or a pill against aging will do as insurence for surviving tomorrow.

Observation and Understanding (copyright P. Klevius 1992-2004)

If one cannot observe something without understanding it, all our experiences are illusions because of the eternal string of corrections made by later experiences. What seems to be true at a particular moment may turn out to be something else in the next, and what we call understanding hence is merely a result of retrospection.The conventional way of grasping the connection between sensory input and behavioral output can be described as observation, i.e. as sensory stimulation followed by understanding. The understanding that it is a stone, for example, follows the observing of a stone. This understanding might in turn produce behavior such as verbal information. To do these simple tasks, however, the observer has to be equipped with some kind of "knowledge," i.e., shared experience that makes him/her culturally competent to "understand" and communicate. This understanding includes the cultural heritage embedded in the very concept of a stone.

Categorization belongs to the language department, which, on the brain level, is only one among many other behavioral reactions. But due to its capability to paraphrase itself, it has the power to confuse our view on how we synchronize our stock of experience. When we look at a stone, our understanding synchronizes with the accumulated inputs associated with the concept of a stone. "It must be a stone out there because it looks like a stone," we think. As a result of such synchronization, our brain intends to continue on the same path and perhaps do something more (with "intention"). For example, we might think, "Let's tell someone about it." The logical behavior that follows can be an expression such as, "Hey look, it's a stone out there." Thus, what we get in the end is a concept of a stone and, after a closer look, our pattern of experience hidden in it.If the stone, when touched, turns out to be made of papier maché, then the previous perception is not deepened, but instead, switched to a completely new one.

One might say that a stone in a picture is a real stone, while the word "stone" written on a piece of paper is not. The gap here is not due to different representations but rather to different contexts.When one tries to equalize observation with understanding, the conventional view of primitive and sophisticated thinking might be put in question. We act like no more than complex worms and the rest, such as sophistication, is only a matter of biased views built on different stocks of experience. But a worm, just like a computer, is more than the sum of its parts.

Therefore, meaning, explanation and understanding are all descriptions of the same basic principle of how we synchronize perceptions with previous experiences. For the fetus or the newborn child, the inexperienced (unsynchronized, or uncertainty/"god" if you prefer) part of the inside-outside communication is considerably huge. Hence the chaotic outside world (i.e., the lack of its patterns of meaningfullness) has to be copied in a stream of experiences, little by little, into the network couplings of the brain. When the neural pattern matches the totality (meaningfulness) its information potential disappears. On top of this, there is in the fetus a continuous growth of new neurons, which have to be connected to the network. As a result of these processes, the outside world is, at least partly, synchronized with the inside, mental world. Heureka, the baby finally begins to think and exist! In other words, the baby records changes against a background of synchronized inputs.

* see "existence centrism" in Demand for Resources for a discussion abt a shrinking god and the allmighty human!

The Category of the Uniquely Human (copyright P. Klevius 1992-2004)

A main difficultiy in formulating the concept of consciousness is our pride (presumably we should have been equally proud as mice) and our strong belief in "something uniquely human." However, if we try to follow the die-hard determinists, we would probably find free will and destiny easier to cope with, and also that the concept of "the unique human being" is rather a question of point of view. Following this line of thought, I suggest turning to old Berkeley as well as to Ryle but excluding Skinnerian Utopias. Those who think the word determinism sounds rude and blunt can try to adorn it with complexity to make it look more chaotic.Chaoa here means something you cannot overview no matter how deterministic it might be. We seem to like complexity just because we cannot follow the underlying determinism. Maybe the same is to be said of what it really is to be a human? A passion for uncertainty, i.e. life itself.Francis Crick in The Astonishing Hypothesis: "... your sense of personal identity and free will are in fact no more than the behavior of a vast assembly of nerve cells and their associated molecules."

This statement is easy to agree on, so let me continue with another, perhaps more useful, quote from Crick: "Categories are not given to us as absolutes. They are human inventions."I think these two statements create an efficient basis for further investigations into the mystery of thinking. Hopefully you will forgive me now as I'm going to try to abolish not only the memory but also the free will and consciousness alltogether. Then, I will go even one step further to deny that there are any thoughts (pictures, representations, etc.) at all in the cortex. At this point, many might agree, particularly regarding the cortex of the author of this text.
The main problem here is the storage of memories, with all their colors, smells, feelings and sounds. Crick suggests the dividing of memory into three parts: episodic, categorical and procedural. While that would be semantically useful, I'm afraid it would act more like an obstacle in the investigation of the brain, because it presupposes that the hardware uses the same basis of classification and, like a virus, hence infects most of our analyses.


Nerves, Loops and "Meetputs" (copyright P. Klevius 1992-2004)

According to Crick, "each thalamic area also receives massive connections from the cortical areas to which it sends information. The exact purpose of these back connections is not yet known." In the following paragraphs, I will outline a hypothetical model in line with this question.The interpretation of the interface between brain and its surrounding as it is presented here has the same starting point as Crick's theory but divides thinking into a relay/network system in the cortex and the perception terminals (or their representatives in the thalamus) around the body like an eternal kaleidoscope. Under this model, imagination would be a back-projected pattern of nerve signals, equal to the original event that caused them but with the signals faded. This view suggests that there are not only inputs and outputs but also "meetputs," i.e., when an input signal goes through and evolves into other signals in the cortex, these new signals meet other input signals in the thalamus.

There is no limit to the possible number of patterns in such a system, and there is no need for memory storage but rather, network couplings. These "couplings," or signals, are constantly running in loops (not all simultaneously but some at any given moment) from the nerve endings in our bodies through the network in the cortex and back again to the thalamus. Of course the back-projected signals have to be discriminated from incoming signals, thereby avoiding confusion regarding fantasy and reality. But this process, though still unknown, could be quite simple and perhaps detected simply by the direction where it comes from. As a consequence of the loops, the back-projected pattern differs from the incoming signals, or the stimuli.Therefore, every signal from the body?perceptions, hormonal signals and so on, either finds its familiar old routes or patterns of association in the network (established experiences) or creates new connections (new experiences) that can be of varying durability. For example, if someone is blind from the moment of birth, he or she will have normal neuronal activity in the cortex area of vision. On the other hand, in case of an acquired blindness, the level of activity in the same area will become significantly lower over time. This is logical according to the EMAH model because, in the former case, the neurons have never become involved in association patterns of vision but were engaged in other tasks. In the latter case, the neurons have partly remained in previous vision patterns, which are no longer in use, while the rest has moved onto other new tasks.

It is important to note that human thinking, contrary to what today's computers do, involves the perceptions that originate from the chemical processes in the body's hormonal system, what we carelessly name "emotions." This, I think, is the main source behind the term "human behavior." The difference between man and machine is a source of concern but, as I see it, there is no point in making a "human machine." But perhaps someone might be interested in building a "human-like machine".


Body vs. Environment - a History of Illusions (copyright P. Klevius 1992-2004)

According to the EMAH model, its nerves define our body. This view does not exactly resemble our conventional view of the human body. Thus, our hormonal signals inside our body, for example, can be viewed?at least partially?as belonging to the environment surrounding the EMAH-body.The meaning of life is to uphold complexity by guarding the borders and it is ultimately a fight against entropy. In this struggle, life is supported by a certain genetic structure and metabolism, which synchronizes its dealings with the surrounding environment. Balancing and neutralizing these dealings is a job done by the nerves.



A major and crucial feature of this "body-guarding" mechanism is  knowledge of  difference in the directions between incoming signals and outgoing, processed signals. On top of this, both areas changes continuously and thus have to be matched against each other to uphold or even improve the complexity. According to this model, people suffering from schizophrenia, just like healthy people, have no problem in discriminating between inputs and outputs. In fact, we can safely assume that the way they sometimes experience hallucinations is just like the way we experience nightmares. Both hallucinations and nightmares seem so frightening because they are perceived as incoming signals and confused as real perceptions. The problem for the schizophrenic lies in a defect in processing due to abnormal functions in and among the receptors on the neurons, which makes the association pattern unstable and "creative" in a way that is completely different compared with controlled fantasies. In the case of nightmares, the confusion is related to low and fluctuating energy levels during sleep.A frightful hallucination is always real because it is based on perceptions. What makes it an illusion is when it is viewed historically from a new point of view or experienced in a new "now," i.e., weighed and recorded as illusory from a standpoint that differs from the original one. In conclusion, one can argue that what really differentiates a frightful ghost from a harmless fantasy is that we know the latter being created inside our body, whereas we feel unsure about the former.


EMAH Computing as Matched Changes (copyright P. Klevius 1992-2004)

EMAH does not support the idea that information is conveyed over distances, both in the peripheral and central nervous systems, by the times of occurrence of action potentials?

"All we are hypothesizing is that the activity in V1 does not directly enter awareness. What does enter awareness, we believe, is some form of the neural activity in certain higher visual areas, since they do project directly to prefrontal areas. This seems well established for cortical areas in the fifth tier of the visual hierarchy, such as MT and V4." (Crick & Koch, 1995a,b).  Hardware in a computer is, together with software (should be “a program” because this word signals programming more directly), specified at the outset. A high level of flexibility is made possible through the hardware's ability to unceasingly customize to incoming signals. This is partly what differs human beings from a machine. The rest of the differentiating factors include our perceptions of body chemistry such as hormones, etc. Programming a computer equipped with flexible hardware, i.e., to make them function like neurons, will, according to the EMAH-model, make the machine resemble the development of a fetus or infant to a certain extent. The development of this machine depends on the type of input terminals.

All input signals in the human, including emotional ones, involve a feedback process that matches the incoming signals from the environment with a changing copy of it in the form of representations in the brain's network couplings.Life starts with a basic set of neurons, the connections of which grow as experiences come flooding in. This complex body of neuronal connections can be divided into permanent couplings, the sum of experiences that is your "personality," and temporary couplings, short-term "memories" for everyday use.

A certain relay connection, if activated, results in a back-projected signal toward every receptor originally involved and thus creates, in collaboration with millions of other signals, a "collage" that we often call awareness. This is a constant flow and is in fact what we refer to as the mysterious consciousness. At this stage, it is important to note that every thought, fantasy or association is a mix of different kinds of signals. You cannot, for example, think about a color alone because it is always "in" or "on" something else (on a surface or embedded in some kind of substance) and connected by relay couplings to other perceptions or hormonal systems. "Meaning" is thus derived from a complex mix of the loops between perceptions and back-projected perceptions. This can be compared to a video camera system with a receiving screen and a back-projecting screen. The light meter is the "personality" and the aperture control the motor system. However, this system lacks the complex network system found in the cortex and thus has no possibility to "remember." The recorded signal is of course not equivalent to the brain?s network couplings because it is fixed.To save "bytes," our brains actually tend to "forget" what has been synchronized rather than remember it. Such changes in the brain?not memories?are what build up our awareness. This process is in fact a common technique in transmitting compressed data.


Short-Term Memories and Dreams (copyright P. Klevius 1992-2004)

At any given moment, incoming signals, or perceptions, have to be understood through fitting and dissolving in the net of associations. If there are new, incomprehensible signals, they become linked (coupled) to the existing net and localized in the present pattern of associations. Whether their couplings finally vanish or stay depends on how they fit into the previous pattern and/or what happens next.

As a consequence of this coupling process, memories in a conventional, semantic meaning do not exist, because everything happens now. Consciousness or awareness is something one cannot influence, but rather, something that involves an ongoing flow of information to and from nerve endings through the brain (a relay station). For every given moment (now), there is consequently only one possible way of acting. One cannot escape awareness or decisions because whatever one thinks, it is based on the past and will rule the future. Memories are thus similar to fantasies of the future, based on and created by experiences.Regarding short-term memory, I agree with Crick's view and hypothesis. But I certainly would not call it memory, only weaker or vanishing couplings between neurons. Remember that with this model, the imagination of something or someone seen a long time ago always has to be projected back on the ports were it came through and thus enabling the appropriate association pattern. Although signals in each individual nerve are all equal, the back-projected pattern makes sense only as a combination of signals. The relay couplings in the cortex is the "code," and the receptor system is the "screen." Because this system does not allow any "escape" from the ever changing "now" which determines the dealings with the surrounding environment. Living creatures are forced to develop their software by living.

Dreams are, according to this model, remains of short-term memories from the previous day(s), connected and mixed with relevant association patterns but excluding a major part of finer association structures. This is why dreams differ from conscious thinking. The lack of finer association structures is due to low or irregular activity levels in the brain during sleep. The results are "confused thoughts," which are quite similar to those of demented people, whose finer neural structures are damaged because of tissue death due to a lack of appropriate blood flow. Thus dreams are relevantly structured but in no way a secret message in the way psychoanalysts see them, whereas patients with dementia tend to go back to their childhood due to the irrevocable nature of the physical retardation process.Investigating dreams and their meanings by interpreting them is essentially the same as labeling them as psychological (in a psychoanalytical sense). A better and less biased result would emerge if the researcher actually lived with the subject the day before the dream occurred. Rather than analyzing pale and almost vanished childhood experiences from a view trapped in theoretical prejudices that describe an uncertain future, the researcher should perhaps put more efforts in the logic of the presence.


Donald Duck and a Stone in the Holy Land of Language (copyright P. Klevius 1992-2004)

Wittgenstein: "Sie ist kein Etwas, aber auch nicht ein Nichts!" (Phil. Untersuch. 304). Also see P. Klevius' analysis of a stone (in Demand for Resources - on the right to be poor, 1992).

Although Wittgenstein describes language as a tool it seems more appropriate to classify it as human behavior. Unlike tools language is a set (family) of a certain kind of bodily reactions (internal and/or towards its environment). We have to reject, not only t"he grammer which tries to force  itself on us", but also, and perhaps even more so, representations we, without any particular reason, assign to language.

Language is basically vocal but apart from that little has been said about its real boundaries. One could actually argue that the bestdefinition is perhaps the view that language is a human territory. The question whether animals have a language is then consequently meaningless. On the other hand, Wittgenstein denied the existence of a "private language" because applying it could never prove the validity of its products.We are trapped in words and connotations of language although these categories themselves, like language in general, are completely arbitrary  "language games," as Wittgenstein would have put it. (No offense, Mr Chomsky and others, but this is the tough reality for those trying to make sense of it in the efforts of constructing intelligent,talking computers). Furthermore, these categories change over time and within different contexts with overlapping borders.

Changing language games provide endless possibilities for creating new "language products", such as e.g. psychodynamic psychology. I believe this is exactly what Wittgenstein had in mind when he found Freud interesting as a player of such games but with nothing to say about the scientific roots of the mental phenomenon.Let's image Donald Duck and a picture of a stone. Like many psychological terms, Donald Duck is very real in his symbolized form but nonetheless without any direct connection to the reality that he symbolizes. In this sense, even the word stone has no connection to the reality for those who don't speak English. Words and languages are shared experiences.

It is said that a crucial feature of language is its ability to express past and future time. This might be true but in no way makes language solely human. When bees arrives to their hive they are able, in symbolic form, to express what they have seen in the past so that other bees will "understand" what to do in the future. Naming this an instinct just because bees have such an uncomplicated brain does not justify a different classification to that of the human thinking.If, as I proposed in Demand for Resources (1992), we stop dividing our interactions with the surrounding world in terms of observation and understanding (because there is no way of separating them), we will find it easier to compare different human societies. By categorization, language is an extension of perception/experience patterns and discriminates us as human only in the sense that we have different experiences. Words are just like everything else that hits our receptors. There is no principle difference in thinking through the use of words or through sounds, smells (albeit not through thalamus), pictures or other "categories." Ultimately, language is, like other types of communication with the surrounding world, just a form of resistance against entropy.

To define it more narrowly, language is also the room where psychoanalysis is supposed to live and work. A stone does not belong to language, but the word "stone" does. What is the difference? How does the word differ from the symbolic expression of a "real" stone in front of you? Or if we put it the other way round: What precisely makes it a stone? Nothing, except for the symbolic value derived from the word "stone." The term "observation" thus implicates an underlying "private language."When Turing mixed up his collapsing bridges with math, he was corrected by Wittgenstein, just as Freud was corrected when he tried to build psychological courses of events on a basis of natural science. Wittgenstein's "no" to Turing at the famous lecture at Cambridge hit home the difference between games and reality.

Archetypes and grammar as evolutionary tracks imprinted in our genes is a favorite theme among certain scholars. But what about other skills? Can there also be some hidden imprints that make driving or playing computer games possible? And what about ice hockey, football, chess, talk shows, chats and so on? The list can go on forever. Again, there is no distinguishing border between evolutionary "imprints" and other stimulus/response features in ordinary life.


"Primitive" vs. "Sophisticated" Thinking (copyright P. Klevius 1992-2004)

The more synchronized (informed) something or someone is with its surrounding reality, the less dynamics/interest this something or someone invests in its relationship with that particular reality. Interest causes investment and social entropy excludes investment economy because economy is always at war against entropy. The key to economical success is luck and thus includes lack of knowledge. No matter how well a business idea is outlined and performed, the success or lack of success is ultimately unforeseeable.In Demand for Resources I discussed the possibility of some serious prejudice hidden in Karl Poppers' top achievement of civilization, namely the "World 3" and his and Eccles' assumption of an increasing level of sophistication from the primitive to the modern stage of development. It is of course easy to be impressed by the sophistication of the artificial, technical environment constructed by man, including language and literature, etc. But there is nonetheless a striking lack of evidence in support of a higher degree of complexity in the civilized human thinking than that of e.g. Australian Aboriginals, say 25,000 years ago. Needless to say, many hunting-gathering societies have been affluent in the way that they have food, shelter and enough time to enrich World 3, but in reality they have failed to do so.

Even on the level of physical anthropology, human evolution gives no good, single answer to our originality. What is "uniquely human" has rested on a "gap," which is now closed, according to Richard Leakey and Roger Lewin, among others. This gap is presumably the same as the one between sensory input and behavioral output mentioned above.From an anthropological point of view, it can be said that a computer lacks genetic kinship, which, however, is a rule without exception in the animate world, although we in the West seem to have underestimated its real power.


Deconstructing the Mind (copyright P. Klevius 1992-2004)

A deconstruction of our underlying concepts of the brain can easily end up in serious troubles due to the problem with language manipulation. Wittgenstein would probably have suggested us to leave it as it is. If language is a way of manipulating a certain area - language - then the confusion will become even greater if we try to manipulate the manipulation! But why not try to find out how suitable "the inner environment" is for deconstruction? After all, this environment presupposes some kind of biology at least in the border line between the outside and the inside world. Are not behavioral reactions as well as intra-bodily causes, e g hormones etc. highly dependent on presumed biological "starting points"? How does skin color or sex hormones affect our thinking? Where do causes and reactions start and isn't even the question a kind of explanation and understanding?

Determinists usually do not recognize the point of free will although they admit the possible existence of freedom. Why? Obviously this needs some Wittgensteinian cleaning of the language. Unfortunately I'm not prepared for the task, so let's pick up only the best looking parts, that words as freedom, will, mind, etc., are semantic inventions and that they have no connections to anything else (i.e., matter) if not proved by convincing and understandable evidence. Does this sound familiar and maybe even boring? Here comes the gap again.Stimuli and response seen purely as a reflex is not always correct, says G. H. von Wright, because sometimes there may be a particular reason causing an action. According to von Wright, an acoustic sensation, for example, is mental and semantic and thus out of reach for the scientific understanding of the body-mind interaction. Is this a view of a diplomatic gentleman eating the cake and wanting to keep it too? To me, it is a deterministic indeterminist's view.

G. H. von Wright concludes that what we experience in our brain is the meaning of its behavioral effects. In making such a conclusion that it is rather a question of two different ways of narrowing one's view on living beings von Wright seems to narrow himself to Spinoza?s view.Is meaning meaningful or is it perhaps only the interpreter's random projection of himself or herself? Is it, in other words, based only on the existence of the word meaning?

Aristotle divided the world primarily into matter and definable reality (psyche). As many other Greek philosophers, Aristotle was an individualist and would have fitted quite well in the Western discourse of today. Berkeley, who was a full-blood determinist, however recognized the sameness in mind and matter and handed both over to "god". Consequently Philonous' perceived sensations in the mind were not directly aligned with Hylas' view of immediate perceptions. We thus end up with Berkeley as a spiritual die-hard determinist challenging materialistic humanism.


Conclusion
                                                                             
In conclusion one might propose a rethinking of the conventional hierarchy of the brain. What we use to call "higher levels", perhaps because they are more pronounced in humans, are in fact only huge "neural mirrors" for the real genius, thalamus (and its capability of two-way communication with extensions in the cerebellum, spine, nerv ends etc), i.e. what has sometimes been interpreted as part of the "primitive" system.. In other words, one may propose a view describing the "gap" between humans and animals as a quantitative difference in the amount/power of cerebral "mirroring" and communication with thalamus, rather than as a distinct qualitative feature. Nothing, except our "emotions", seems to hinder us from making a "human machine". And because these very "emotions" are lived experiences (there is, for example, no way to scientifically establish what could be considered "emotions" in a fetus) nothing, except the meaninglessness in the project itself, could hinder us from allowing a machine to "live" a "human life".

So what about human rights for a computer (Honda's Asimo robot) loaded with all possible human "emotions"? Is Asimo human or Klevius inhuman? Is death what ultimately unites humans? So what abt a hypothetical memory card containing a lifetime of experience? Or a fetus with hardly no experience at all?

Klevius comment: A thoroughly honest approach towards others combined with negative human rights seems to be the only acceptable framework for being really human. This approach hence excludes segregation as well as "monotheist"* religions (but see Klevius definition of religion).

Monday, March 6, 2017

~115,000 year old 1,800cc "mongoloid" skull from China fits perfectly in Peter Klevius theory on human evolution


~105,000- to 125,000-year-old archaic human crania from Xuchang, China shows incipient mongoloid and Neanderthal traits - may be Denisovans. 



Neanderthal male ~1600cc  (~50,000bp), Xuchang 1 male 1800cc (~115,000bp)  Jinniushan female ~1400cc (260,000bp).                   

Zhan-Yang Li et al.: Two early Late Pleistocene crania from Lingjing, Xuchang, China, exhibit a morphological mosaic with differences from and similarities to their western contemporaries. They share pan–Old World trends in encephalization and in supraorbital, neurocranial vault, and nuchal gracilization. They reflect eastern Eurasian ancestry in having low, sagittally flat, and inferiorly broad neurocrania. They share occipital (suprainiac and nuchal torus) and temporal labyrinthine (semicircular canal) morphology with the Neandertals. This morphological combination reflects Pleistocene human evolutionary patterns in general biology, as well as both regional continuity and interregional population dynamics.

The ~260,000bp incipient "mongoloid" Jinniushan from northern China - a corner stone in Peter Klevius' published theory on human evolution since 1992.

Klevius question in his 1992 book was twofold:

1 How come that there was a "mongoloid" big brained skull in northern China  two ice age cycles before present, yet nothing really happened before ~50,000bp?

2  How come that the oldest modern Africans are "mongoloids" - but much younger in Africa than the China fossils?

Add to this the remarkable Liujiang from China (see below).


Both fossils show clear cold adaptation (mongoloid) traits. However, Jinniushan (right) is older and has a bigger cranial capacity although it's female.

In Demand for Resources (1992:28 ISBN 9173288411) in a chapter about human evolution, Peter Klevius used only one example, the remarkable Jinniushan skeleton/cranium:

In northern China near North Korean border an almost complete skeleton of a young man who died 280,000 years ago. The skeleton was remarkable because its big cranial volume (1,400cc) was not expected in Homo erectus territory at this early time and even if classified as Homo sapiens it was still big. The anatomically completely modern human brain volume is 1,400 cc and appeared between 50-100,000 years ago. One may therefore conclude that big brain volume by far predated more sophisticated human behavior (Klevius 1992:28).

Today, when many believe the skeleton is female, the brain size becomes even more remarkable.

However, today, after the revelation of Homo floresiensis, there's a clear candidate to answering Klevius questions above: tropical island dwarfed brain, and its genetic spread up to the previously dumb but big skulled (to compensate for some of their dumbness) northerners. When these genes met the result was an explosion of intelligence in some of the northerners.

Klevius wrote:

Thursday, March 15, 2012 (with some random updates)

The Red Deer Cave people add more evidence for Klevius’ ape/homo hybridization theory


The irrefutable art track in Northern Eurasia (see map below) has no contemporary equivalent in other parts of the world. Based on what we know now it had no fore bearers whatsoever in any period of time. Moreover, it seems that there was even a decline before "civilizations" started tens of thousands of years later! Yet Klevius seems to be the only one addressing this most interesting (besides genetics) fact! According to Klevius (and no one else so far) the new and more efficient brain evolved in a jungle environment (SE Asia?) and spread up until meeting with big headed Neanderthals hence creating the modern human who later spread and dissolved with archaic homos. In this process Homo erectus was most probably involved as well.

Updated info about the origin of Klevius' theory

Keep in mind that mainland SE Asia possibly harbored physically truly modern humans already before the time range (12,000/18,000 ybp - 98,000 ybp) of the Homo floresiensis remains in the Flores cave.



Liujiang, SE China (est. 100,000-140,000ybp)


If this Liujiang skull had been found in Africa or Mideast Wikipedia and other media would be overfilled. But this is all you get now (summer 2015 update) from Wikipedia about this extremely important skull:



The Liujiang skull probably came from sediment dating to 111 000 to 139 000 which would mean it's older than the oldest Homo floresiensis remains on Flores. Nothing even remotely close to this modern skull has ever been found in Africa, Mideast or Europe this early. In other words, we have the extremely archaic looking Red Deer Cave people 100,000 years after this extremely modern looking Liujiang population at approximately the same region. Even the least probable estimate of 70,000 bp would make Liujiang more modern looking than anything else.

Also compare Lake Mungo remains in Australia with an mtDNA that differs completely from ours (incl. Australian Aborigines). Sadly the remains have been kept out of further research because of stupid* "Aboriginal"(?!) greed (for the purpose of making certain people more "special" than others for no good reason at all (also compare the ridiculous Kennewick man controversy). Does it need to be said that the Mungo remains are as far from Australian Aborigines in appearance as you can imagine. However, according to Alan Thorne, 'Mungo could not have come from Africa as, just like Aboriginal Australians don't look like anybody from Africa, Mungo Man's skeleton doesn't look like anybody from Africa either. LM3 skeleton was of a gracile individual, estimated stature of 196 cm, which all sharply contrast with the morphology of modern indigenous Australians. Compared to the older Liujiang skull Mungo man had a much smaller brain.

* There's no way anyone can state who was "first" in Australia - and even if there was, then there's still no way of  making any meaningful connection to now living people.



Updated map


Most "mysteries" in genetics disappear by abandoning OOA and changing direction of HSS evolution. Only South East Asia offered a combination of tropical island/mainland fluctuations needed to put pressure on size reduction paired with evolutionary isolation in an environment where only those survived who managed to shrink their heads while keeping the same intelligence as their mainland kins with some double the sized brain. Homo floresiensis is evidence that such has happened there.


Denisovan is an extinct species of human in the genus Homo. In March 2010, scientists announced the discovery of a finger bone fragment of a juvenile female who lived about 41,000 years ago, found in the remote Denisova Cave in the Altai Mountains in Siberia, a cave which has also been inhabited by Neanderthals and modern humans. Two teeth and a toe bone belonging to different members of the same population have since been reported.

Analysis of the mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) of the Denisovan finger bone showed it to be genetically distinct from the mtDNAs of Neanderthals and modern humans. Subsequent study of the nuclear genome from this specimen suggests that this group shares a common origin with Neanderthals, that they ranged from Siberia to Southeast Asia, and that they lived among and interbred with the ancestors of some present-day modern humans, with about 3% to 5% of the DNA of Melanesians and Aboriginal Australians deriving from Denisovans. DNA discovered in Spain suggests that Denisovans at some point resided in Western Europe, where Neanderthals were thought to be the only inhabitants. A comparison with the genome of a Neanderthal from the same cave revealed significant local interbreeding, with local Neanderthal DNA representing 17% of the Denisovan genome, while evidence was also detected of interbreeding with an as yet unidentified ancient human lineage. Similar analysis of a toe bone discovered in 2011 is underway, while analysis of DNA from two teeth found in layers different from the finger bone revealed an unexpected degree of mtDNA divergence among Denisovans. In 2013, mitochondrial DNA from a 400,000-year-old hominin femur bone from Spain, which had been seen as either Neanderthal or Homo heidelbergensis, was found to be closer to Denisovan mtDNA than to Neanderthal mtDNA.

Little is known of the precise anatomical features of the Denisovans, since the only physical remains discovered thus far are the finger bone, two teeth from which genetic material has been gathered and a toe bone. The single finger bone is unusually broad and robust, well outside the variation seen in modern people. Surprisingly, it belonged to a female, indicating that the Denisovans were extremely robust, perhaps similar in build to the Neanderthals. The tooth that has been characterized shares no derived morphological features with Neanderthal or modern humans. An initial morphological characterization of the toe bone led to the suggestion that it may have belonged to a Neanderthal-Denisovan hybrid individual, although a critic suggested that the morphology was inconclusive. This toe bone's DNA was analyzed by Pääbo. After looking at the full genome, Pääbo and others confirmed that humans produced hybrids with Denisovans.

Some older finds may or may not belong to the Denisovan line. These includes the skulls from Dali and Maba, and a number of more fragmentary remains from Asia. Asia is not well mapped with regard to human evolution, and the above finds may represent a group of "Asian Neanderthals".

Jinniushan and Floresiensis - the keys to Denisovan and the truly modern humans

Jinniushan had a bigger brain than anything in contemporary Africa




In Demand for Resources (1992:28 ISBN 9173288411) in a chapter about human evolution, Peter Klevius used only one example, the remarkable Jinniushan skeleton/cranium:

In northern China near North Korean border an almost complete skeleton of a young man who died 280,000 years ago. The skeleton was remarkable because its big cranial volume (1,400cc) was not expected in Homo erectus territory at this early time and even if classified as Homo sapiens it was still big. The anatomically completely modern human brain volume is 1,400 cc and appeared between 50-100,000 years ago. One may therefore conclude that big brain volume by far predated more sophisticated human behavior (Klevius 1992:28).

Today, when many believe the skeleton is female, the brain size becomes even more remarkable.

Since 1991 when Klevius wrote his book much new information has been produced. However, it seems that the Jinniushan archaic Homo sapiens still constitutes the most spectacular anomaly (together with Homo floresiensis) in anthropology. So why did Klevius pick Jinniushan instead of one of the more fashionable human remains? After all, Klevius was a big fan of Rchard Leakey (he even interviewed him in a lengthy program for the Finnish YLE broadcasting company) and there was a lot of exciting bones appearing from the Rift Valley.

In the 1980s Klevius paid special attention to Australian aborigines and African "bushmen" and noted that the latter were mongoloid in appearance (even more so considering that todays Khoe-San/Khoisan are heavily mixed with Bantu speakers). But mongoloid features are due to cold adaptation in the north and therefore the "bushmen" had to be related to Eurasia. Klevius soon realized that the Khoisan speakers had moved to the southern Africa quite recently as a consequence of the so called Bantu expansion. More studies indicated that the "bushmen" had previously populated most of east Africa up to the Red Sea and beyond.

So the next step for Klevius was to search for early big skulled human remains in the mongoloid northern part of Eurasia. And that search really paid off.

This happened more than 20 years before the discovery of the Denisova bracelet and the human relative Denisovan in Altai. 

Klevius book Demand for Resources (1992) in which these thoughts about mongoloid traits were published also predates Floresiensis with more than a decade.







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Saturday, February 25, 2017

Fake science from Stanford - and Peter Klevius warning (and cure) about it from 1992


If your research/analysis isn't popular it will be dismissed/neglected - no matter how truthfully it's made. Same thing if your research/analysis doesn't comply with those in power* (PC media - incl. so called "scientific" journals).


* Do understand that science has two legs, a particular and a general. The particular consists of tiny bits of research that then has to be translated into the whole. And whereas the former only demands technical knowledge of the research process, the latter demands both intelligence and as little bias as possible. Bias in the former would just mean it's no real science, whereas bias in the latter is inevitable, yet should be kept by all means to a minimum. Unfortunately many researchers are unable to distinguish between the particular and the general. However, Peter Klevius thinks he possesses more than average research intelligence. Why? 1) He had super intelligent parents, 2) he has been told by two of Finland's top professors (from two completely different disciplines - philosophy and neuroscience) that he has the perfect talent for precisely this altering between the particular and the general, 3) he has no financial ties with what he researches (which fact, in fact, is used belttle him), 4) he calls himself a physical as well as cultural "bastard" meaning that he is free from most types of "community bias", 5) he leads a happy life and has his moral stance towards others completely connected to the (negative) Human Rights declaration of 1948. 

So true science and fake "science" are irreconcilable. However, this isn't immediately obvious because, like e.g. HIV, the scientific process that was aimed at eliminating bias, itself became the best hiding place for cultural, political, religious, financial etc. bias.
Drawing by Peter Klevius from a lecture about the chapter Science and References in Demand for Resources (Klevius, 1992:40-44, ISBN 9173288411).

Fake science rooted in Stanford - and applauded by BBC (which is heavily connected to islamofascism via the islamofascist Saudi dictator family's UK connections).



So true science and fake "science" are irreconcilable. However, this isn't immediately obvious because, like e.g. HIV, the scientific process that was aimed at eliminating bias, itself became the best hiding place for cultural, political, religious, financial etc. bias.

Four academic examples from Klevius own experience:


1 A thesis in social anthropology was criticized for not being written "in the fashion we do it here", although the thesis was simultaneously highly praised for "the author's intelligent writing" and "superb use of citations" (Klevius himself warns for "citation cartels" in his 1992 book Demand for Resources).

2  An other thesis in sociology in the 1990s was criticized for showing that perpetrators of child sexual abuse, as reported in the most prominent scientific literature, was least likely to be a biological parent, and most likely to occur outside the home. This study was in response to the Swedish state radio which had a long daily "incest" insert in their main news hour over a period of 18 days, where sex abuse numbers by stepfathers, step siblings, peers etc. were presented in a way that made the listeners believe it was parental incest. The series seems to have been a direct support for more funds to the "social state"* (aka the "welfare state"). An opponent asked Klevius: "Why do you do this?" Klevius answer, that he wanted to warn for the serious consequences for the child in case of false accusations - and the fact that other more prevalent abuse went unnoticed, was met with total silence. Moreover, that the so far biggest study on the welfare of children taken into care in the Swedish system didn't stand up to even the lowest expectations, was also met with something resembling disgust. And finally, that the world's most extensive study on child sex abuse in Finland didn't at all correspond with the picture given by media and social state bureaucrats and politicians, seemed to have no value whatsoever compared to the state radio propaganda.

*To understadn the "social state" do read Angels of Antichrist and Pathological Symbiosis.

3  In Klevius thesis "Pathological Symbiosis" it was shown that social state bureaucrats directly influenced and managed to implement a criterion for abducting children from their parents based on a psychological non sense term (which history Klevius thoroughly traced back to Freud's time). When it became the law it wasn't any longer taken seriously even by researchers in psychology but became popular among welfare officials. And to hide this insidious criterion from ordinary people it was hidden in the preparatory works which people rarely read. And the text in the law paragraph used the old formulation "or some other condition in the home", but now also applying to the new hidden criterion "pathological symbiosis". Moreover, in psychologists' statements used in court hearings there was no mentioning about "pathological symbiosis" but rather its "legal synonyms" such as, for example, "the mother doesn't understand the needs of her child" etc.. Klevius would never have seen it was it not for him working as a solicitor in child custody cases and reading through several hundred cases which looked suspicious when it came to the reason for taking a child into the care of the social state.

4 A thesis about how to analyze restraints on girls'/women's freedom imposed by sex segregation and poorly understood/analyzed connection to heterosexual attraction, was criticized by a female professor with the following words: "Why don't you want to let women lead their lives as they wish?" Quite a surprising remark considering that Klevius thesis used the 1948 Human Rights declaration and its emphasis on 'sex' not being used as an excuse for restricting any Human Rights. The simple minded professor obviously thought it somehow threatening to let women free from sex segregation restrains.


BBC's guest from the Medical Research Council discussing fake research: Irreproducibility could give rise to new results.


Peter Klevius: Sorry, but that's not science - it's luck.


85% irreproducibility, i.e. replication failed.

Out of 5 cancer studies only 2 could be reproduced.

Causes mentioned:

publication crisis

pressure from funders

priority based on what the researcher have published before - not the scientific quality of the actual work at stake.

incompetency

too small sample size

studying the wrong thing (compare Klevius drawing above)

"curated" literature (compare what Klevius wrote 1992 - especially about citation cartels and lists.

selective reporting

statistics manipulated - usually by leaving out important data (i.e. not just simple tampering with data) or by sampling errors.

peer review - which may be equally polarized as politics, hence bundling/tying "peers" in a certain paradigm/discourse enclosure (see Klevius cure on Inside Klevius mind on Klevius' web museum - not touched upon for more than a decade).


Peter Klevius bias check on fake assessment of fake science - i.e. "pseudo-science quacks" from Stanford.


Here's an example of pseudo-science quacks (psychology) presented as science by John Ioannidis (Stanford) and commented by Peter Klevius (no surprise it's published in a "social state" paper - read Klevius' Angels of Antichrist or his thesis Pathological Symbiosis, to really understand this):

Yes, Klevius, who plays in the heavyweight class, apologizes for correcting a guy from a lower class. However, Klevius isn't interested in John Ioannidis' IQ disability but rather in his bias (witting or unwitting) and the framework he offers by defending "pseudo-science quacks" like psychology by calling it "science". Reminds Klevius of his own example in Demand for Resources (1992 ISBN 9173288411) where a phycisist and a psychologist studied the effects of an egg falling on the head of a person. Whereas the physicist's findings were replicable (the main pattern of the cracks in the shell and due flow of soft material), the psychologist's findings (reaction of the test person) were not. And even if the test person (compare test bench) was altered by being informed in advance, that would only either have made the study meaningless, or being used to "verify" the obvious without getting even close to a result deserving the term science. Not to mention the problem with citations, falsifiability etc.. Wittgenstein (the mentor of his successor at Cambridge, G H von Wright, who mentored Klevius) would probably not have approved of it.

John Ioannidis: Science is the best thing that has happened to humankind because its results can be questioned, retested, and demonstrated to be wrong. Science is not about proving at all cost some preconceived dogma.

Peter Klevius: Well, that's what child psychology has been doing since Freud. As is the sex segregation dogma that Klevius was the first to puncture (see e.g. Pathological Symbiosis, and other works by Klevius revealing the core problem of social state "science" and sex segregation). Children have no say of their own, and are therefore the perfect market place for "pseudo-science quacks". And only a child can today be legally forced into "gender dogmas" (compare DSM). Moreover, the "social state" (see e.g. Angels of Antichrist, and Pathological Symbiosis) is the perfect field for growing "quacks" because it not only pushes forward its own agenda and due legislation, but it also possesses authority - i.e. the exact opposite to the private sector (yet it of course transgresses into the private sector whenever it suits it). The "social state" exists in a protective bubble labeled "welfare" (for whom? - read Angels of Antichrist).

John Ioannidis: Despite this clear superiority of the scientific method, we researchers (sic) are still fallible humans. 270 investigators working for five years published in Science the results of their efforts to replicate 100 important results that had been previously published in three top psychology journals. The replicators worked closely with the original authors to make the repeat experiments close replicas of the originals. The results were bleak: 64% of the experiments could not be replicated.

Peter Klevius: "Working close with the original authors" was their first mistake, and probably gave a too positive result (also compare Tienari et al adoptive study and their own "instrument" for assessing their own evaluation of their own study, referred to in Klevius' Angels of Antichrist, 1996).

John Ioannidis: We often feel uneasy about having our results probed for possible debunking. We don’t always exactly celebrate when we are proven wrong. For example, retracting published papers can take many years and many editors, lawyers, and whistleblowers – and most debunked published papers are never retracted. Moreover, with fierce competition for limited research funds and with millions of researchers struggling to make a living (publish, get grants, get promoted), we are under immense pressure to make “significant”, “innovative” discoveries. Many scientific fields are thus being flooded with claimed discoveries that nobody ever retests. Retesting (called replication) is discouraged. In most fields, no funding is given for what is pooh-poohed as me-too efforts. We are forced to hasten from one “significant” paper to the next without ever reassessing our previously claimed successes.

Peter Klevius: "We"?! Try to hide behind the back of reliable quantitative science? Psychology is a so called "qualitative science" which started as a quantitative measuring of factual animal behavior, but sadly ended up as a "qualitative" guesswork about human future behavior - i.e. a mission completely impossible keeping in mind the endless and never reachable amount of existing (but not accessible) "experience data" and their possible reactions to a myriad of possible future settings for the child/adult. In other words this is just folk psychology wrapped in money.

John Ioannidis: Multiple lines of evidence suggest this is a recipe for disaster, leading to a scientific literature littered with long chains of irreproducible results. Irreproducibility is rarely an issue of fraud. Simply having millions of hardworking scientists searching fervently and creatively in billions of analyses for something statistically significant can lead to very high rates of false-positives (red-herring claims about things that don’t exist) or inflated results.

Peter Klevius: Let me just quote myself (in a hasty translation from Swedish) from my book Demand for Resources (1992:43): Especially within the realm of social science these tendencies are reaching worrying dimensions, and one can already see how citations are streamlined for political purpose in a way where legislation  is "prepared" via tailored "research" as a part in society's - to borrow Habermas - "increased manipulation of motives/social control". However, the system itself becomes a new paradigm and discourse where this bias becomes so overwhelming that it can only be questioned outside itself (for how to do this, see Inside Klevius Mind - http://klevius.info/IQdepth.html?1076884215269 - on Klevius web museum, which is left untouched since more than a decade ago). In this respect it resembles sex segregation, where true* feminism (i.e. segregational) hinders scrutiny of women's own role in it.

* In popular usage 'feminism' is often seen as women's right to transgress over "gender lines" i.e. the very opposite to sex segregation in feminist theory/ies (read some of Klevius many 'sex tutorials'.

John Ioannidis: This is more likely to happen in fields that chase subtle, complex phenomena, in those that have more noise in measurement, and where there is more room for subjective choices to be introduced in designing and running experiments and crunching the data. Ten years ago I tried to model these factors. These models predicted that in most scientific fields and settings the majority of published research, findings may be false. They also anticipated that the false rates could vary greatly (from almost 0% to almost 100%), depending on the features of a scientific discipline and how scientists run their work.

Peter Klevius: Scientific bias feeds on noise! Without it politicized "science" wouldn't be possible. When Klevius in a TV debate critiziced the quality of social state interference in children's lives and that these consequences weren't properly dealt with, he was accused for not being the criminologist his academic credentials said he was. Obviously, being a criminologist meant that one should not be critical of the social state (which feeds most criminologists).

John Ioannidis: Probably the failure rate in the Science data would have been higher for work published in journals of lesser quality. There are tens of thousands of journals in the scientific-publishing market, and most will publish almost anything submitted to them. The failure rate may also be higher for studies that are so complex that none of the collaborating replicators offered to attempt a replication. This group accounted for one-third of the studies published in the three top journals. So the replication failure rate for psychology at large may be 80% or more overall.

Peter Klevius: By "lesser quality" Ioannidis apparently means journals publishing studies/analysis which aren't PC and/or streamlined for psychology and the social state.

John Ioannidis: This performance is even worse than I would have predicted. In 2012 my anticipation of a 53% replication failure rate for psychology at large was published. Compared with other empirical studies, the failure rate of psychology seems to be in the same ballpark as replication failure rates in observational epidemiology, cancer drug targets and preclinical research, and animal experiments.

Peter Klevius: There's no replicability in psychology. What he rants about is simply statistics. "In fields that chase subtle, complex phenomena, in those that have more noise in measurement, and where there is more room for subjective choices to be introduced in designing and running experiments and crunching the data" truly scientific results cab never be produced. And if the results are "replicable" it's just at the same level as folk psychology - or possibly even less if there's "scientific" bias involved.

John Ioannidis: However, I think it is important to focus on the positive side. The Science paper shows that large-scale replication efforts of high quality are doable even in fields like psychology where there was no strong replication culture until recently. Hopefully this successful, highly informative paradigm will help improve research practices in this field. Many other scientific fields without strong replication cultures may also be prompted now to embrace replications and reproducible research practices. Thus these seemingly disappointing results offer a great opportunity to strengthen scientific investigation. I look forward to celebrate one day when my claim that most published research findings are false is thoroughly refutedrr across most, if not all, scientific fields.

Peter Klevius: There can never exist a fair "replication culture" in psychology (incl. so called psychodynamic "theory") because it suffers from the same disease as psychoanalysis, feminist theory etc., i.e. more or less openly admitting not being scientific in the first place, yet trying to convince us of being above folk level.